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THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND OBEDIENCE TO LAW 
COLLEEN MURPHY* 
In The Rule of Law in the Real World, Paul Gowder engages three audiences: 
philosophers interested in the concept and normative value of the rule of law, 
political scientists interested in measuring and empirically assessing the degree 
to which societies meet its demands, and development scholars aiming to 
cultivate the rule of law in contexts where it is currently absent or minimally 
present.1 Gowder covers an impressive range of materials from across 
disciplines, and his synthesis of different strands of thought about the rule of law 
is brilliant. 
Gowder defends a version of the rule of law that consists in three basic 
principles: a principle of regularity (which requires officials in their conduct and 
action to adhere to a reasonable conception of what declared legal rules permit 
and prohibit, especially in the coercive use of state power); publicity (which 
requires that legal rules be made known to legal subjects in advance, be justified 
or justifiable to them, and be open to contestation by those subject to coercion).2 
These first two principles constitute the weak version of the rule of law and 
provide safeguards against two kinds of threats: hubris (in which officials act 
coercively toward subjects without offering any reason for the basis of their 
actions, and in this way treat legal subjects as their inferiors not warranting any 
explanation); and terror (where the conditions under which officials’ use of 
coercion is not made known to citizens in advance and so subjects are not put in 
a position where they can reliably determine what actions to take to avoid 
coercion).3 These two conditions, Gowder argues, are mutually reinforcing.4 
This minimal version does not place demands on the substantive content of law; 
it does not entail respect for rights and it is compatible with unjust articulations 
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 1. PAUL GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 4 (2016). The second criticism 
was published in my review of Gowder’s book for the Tulsa Law Review. Colleen Murphy, The 
Rule of Law and Obedience to Law, 53 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 2. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 7. 
 3. Id. at 8. 
 4. Id. at 7. 
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of the conditions under which coercion will be exercised. The third condition, 
which transforms the rule of law from its weak to strong version is a principle 
of generality (which requires laws to treat legal subjects equally, or as equals); 
Gowder specifies the demand of generality as a demand to satisfy the constraints 
of public reason.5 The explanation of the purpose of a particular regulation must 
appeal to reasons that can be reasons for those asked to obey, legislators, as well 
as the broader community.6 Such reasons cannot hinge on the subordinate status 
of some relative to others to explain why a given rule obtains.7 Together, these 
principles constitute the rule of law as an egalitarian ideal, structuring 
relationships of vertical equality (between legal subjects and officials) and 
horizontal equality (among citizens).8 
After articulating these three principles, which he notes can be met to 
different degrees and which do not require any specific institutional 
arrangement, Gowder goes on to show how ancient Athens and contemporary 
Britain fared according to the criteria articulated above.9 He then considers the 
conditions under which the rule of law will be stable and under which it can be 
cultivated in contexts where it is absent.10 Stability turns on equality in 
Gowder’s view; to the extent that a legal system satisfies the generality condition 
it is stable in part because of the commitment to the rule of law this generates.11 
Generating the rule of law is also a function of generating commitment to law 
as the way in which interaction between citizens and officials and among citizens 
will be structured, as well as fostering control of the use of force by the state 
among other conditions.12 
Like all theories, Gowder’s account has a certain set of starting points and 
basic assumptions that orient his theory. I focus on two in particular: (a) framing 
the principle of generality as an egalitarian principle; (b) rejecting the claim that 
the rule of law requires obedience on the part of citizens. 
I.  GENERALITY AS AN EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLE 
Gowder begins chapter two with the following statement: “It is widely 
accepted among rule of law scholars, as well as lawyers and philosophers at 
large, that the law must be general—that it must treat all in the community 
equally, or as equals.”13 Gowder then sets for himself the task of explaining what 
understanding of generality we should adopt. An adequate understanding, 
 
 5. Id. at 7–8. 
 6. Id. at 11. 
 7. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 11. 
 8. Id. at 7–8. 
 9. Id. at 5. 
 10. Id. at 167. 
 11. Id. at 31, 76. 
 12. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 73, 75. 
 13. Id. at 28. 
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Gowder claims, will be such that it helps us specify what it means for law to 
treat all in the community equally.14 Before defending his considered 
conception, Gowder notes that some theorists do dissent with the thought that 
generality is an egalitarian principle, citing Joseph Raz specifically.15 Raz, 
Gowder writes, rejects the idea that generality has anything to do with equality 
and claims that the rule of law is compatible with discrimination.16 But, despite 
this caveat, Gowder states that his assumption that generality is an egalitarian 
principle “is neither novel nor controversial.”17 
My first point is that defining generality as an egalitarian principle requires 
a more robust defense. It is controversial not simply because leading theorists of 
the rule of law, Raz as well as Lon Fuller, flat out reject the claim that serves as 
Gowder’s starting point (though this by itself should warrant at least some words 
of defense on Gowder’s part).18 It is also controversial because it is at odds with 
a basic intuition about the rule of law held by many (one might even say most) 
people. This is the intuition that the rule of law is compatible with profound 
injustice, particularly in the form of discrimination and gross inequality. 
When numerous scholars—and ordinary citizens—think of Nazi Germany, 
apartheid South Africa, and the Jim Crow South in the United States, these 
societies are frequently characterized as ones in which regimes pursued gross 
injustice while respecting the rule of law. No one challenges the inegalitarian 
structure of these legal systems. The starting point is precisely the reverse: 
recognition of the profoundly inegalitarian character of such systems. Such cases 
are seen as challenging the strength of the moral value of the rule of law precisely 
because they are cases in which the rule of law is taken to have been satisfied by 
flagrantly discriminatory and unjust legal regimes. Governing by law does not 
guarantee that the law will be good law. And, so the thinking goes, this is true 
regardless of how robustly the requirements of the rule of law are satisfied. Put 
differently, Gowder’s starting point is the assertion that the rule of law cannot 
be inegalitarian,19 when it is precisely the intuition that the rule of law can be 
profoundly inegalitarian which troubles those who view apartheid South Africa 
and Jim Crow United States as paradigm cases of respect for the rule of law that 
was grossly unjust. From personal experience, I can say with confidence that 
this conviction is both widely shared and runs very deep. I have argued against 
it, but making the argument (on the basis of grounds that are different than 
 
 14. Id. at 29–30. 
 15. Id. at 2. 
 16. Id. at 29, 74. 
 17. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 28. 
 18. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–49 (3rd prtg. 1967); GOWDER, supra note 1, 
at 75–77. 
 19. See GOWDER, supra note 1, at 58. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
296 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:293 
Gowder’s grounds) was a case to be made and a case that was almost always 
met with (deep) skepticism.20 
In addition to contesting the egalitarian character of the rule of law 
generally, there is reason to question Gowder’s egalitarian interpretation of the 
generality requirement. Gowder simply stipulates that if the generality 
requirement of the rule of law rules out anything, it rules out the rules 
constitutive of apartheid or Jim Crow.21 In his words, if any principle is not 
general, “Black people must sit at the back of the bus” is.22 But this move, too, 
is controversial. There is nothing incoherent—at least conceptually—about rules 
that are general but in a discriminatory way. Good laws are not discriminatory, 
but it seems on the face possible that a system of law may be general but in a 
discriminatory manner. Indeed, scholars like Fuller explicitly reject the demand 
that generality requires equality.23 Fuller writes, 
The first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules is an obvious one: there must be rules. This may be stated 
as the requirement of generality. . . . the desideratum of generality is sometimes 
interpreted to mean that the law must act impersonally, that its rules must apply 
to general classes and should contain no proper names. . . . But the principle 
protected by these provisions is a principle of fairness, which, in terms of the 
analysis presented here, belongs to the external morality of the law. This 
principle is different from the demand of the law’s internal morality that, at the 
very minimum, there must be rules of some kind, however fair or unfair they 
may be.24 
My final point on the relationship between the rule of law and equality 
concerns the relationship between the rule of law and democracy. The principle 
of generality, as Gowder defines it, is, I will suggest, incompatible with non-
liberal democratic regimes conceptually and not just empirically. The principle 
of generality Gowder endorses requires us to examine the expressive function of 
laws and consider whether they could be publicly justified to the community, 
the legislator, and the particular individual being asked to submit to a particular 
rule. At various points, Gowder mentions the compatibility of his account of the 
rule of law (even in its strong version) with different types of regimes, including 
theocratic monarchies.25 I am skeptical that this case can be made. 
Consider first the cluster of rules specifying the basis on which one assumes 
control of decision-making in a political community. What mode of governance 
 
 20. See Colleen Murphy, A MORAL THEORY OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION 41–42 (2010); 
Colleen Murphy, Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law, 24 LAW & PHIL. 239, 251 
(2005). 
 21. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 42, 210. 
 22. Id. at 32. 
 23. FULLER, supra note 18, at 46–47. 
 24. Id. 
 25. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 148–49. 
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can be justified to those who will be governed under it that is compatible with 
recognition of the equal status of all? Gowder conjectures that in a religious 
community power being given to the clergy may not be experienced as insulting 
to those who are under its rules.26 However, the salient question is not whether 
it could be empirically experienced this way. Rather, the question is what kind 
of reason could be offered for excluding non-clergy from political decision-
making that would be compatible with recognizing the equal status of all 
citizens? Any justification would appeal to the greater theological knowledge or 
wisdom or tradition of members of the clergy or perhaps their special standing 
within a community. But this seems to say that citizens are not the equal of 
clergy in a community, and non-equal for reasons that seem arbitrary for 
purposes of political decision-making. By contrast, democracy is a form of 
decision-making, as Thomas Christiano notes, minimally predicated on equality 
at key moments of collective decision-making.27 The normative core of 
democracy is that all individuals have a right to have a say—and an equal say—
in how they are governed, by whom they are governed.28 Public justification 
seems straightforward. 
Similarly, when it comes to key rights associated with liberal democracies 
(e.g., rights to bodily integrity, rights to political participation, rights to speech 
and assembly), inclusion of recognition and protection of such rights seems 
necessary for law to be general in the sense of respecting the equal status of all. 
Human rights are widely taken to be constitutive of recognizing the dignity of 
human beings, and reflect the basic claims and entitlements that individuals can 
make on others. For what possible public reasons could be offered in defense of 
the failure to recognize such rights? 
What I am suggesting, then, is that the question of the relationship between 
the rule of law and liberal democracy is not only an empirical question to be 
asked and answered by investigation of actual societies. Rather, if the strong 
version of the rule of law entails generality as an egalitarian principle requiring 
the justification of laws on the basis of public reasons acceptable to all, the rule 
of law demands democracy and robust protection of human rights. This 
conclusion should give us pause. An underlying worry about the strong version 
of the rule of law is a suspicion that Gowder has conflated the rule of law with 
the rule of good law, building more into what it takes to have, strictly speaking, 
law govern. And the urge to establish conditions under which it is not only law 
that rules, but law that is good, overlooks resources available to critique practices 
and rules without the cost of conflating the rule of law as one ideal among many 
which societies should strive to achieve. 
 
 26. Id. at 158–59. 
 27. Thomas Christiano, Democracy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jul. 27, 2006), http://plato. 
stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/democracy/ [https://perma.cc/43DZ-H9KD]. 
 28. Thomas Christiano, The Authority of Democracy, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 266, 274 (2004). 
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II.  OBEDIENCE TO LAW 
A consistent commitment of Gowder is that the demands of the rule of law 
are demands on officials or those individuals or groups who exercise state-like 
power.29 His hesitancy to include any obligation of obedience on the part of 
citizens is based in part on his understanding of the source of the problem to 
which the rule of law is a solution.30 The law, in Gowder’s view, is a safeguard 
against tyranny and the tyrannical use of the power of the state to oppress and 
unjustly use violence against those subject to its power.31 This is why the rule of 
law constrains officials in their exercise of power. 
Moreover, demanding that citizens obey the law risks putting citizens in a 
position where they are being asked to submit to their own oppression rather 
than putting them in a position to contest state power and its abuse. This 
implication would potentially undermine the notion that the rule of law is a 
moral good. As Gowder writes,  
If the rule of law requires ordinary citizens to obey the laws, it would 
require—or at least offer some defeasible reason in favor of—citizens to obey 
even such evil laws. In doing so, it would perpetrate injustice, and might in fact 
bring it about that partial satisfaction of the rule of law is worse than no 
satisfaction of it. While this may simply be a moral truth—perhaps the rule of 
law has the potential for great wickedness in its partial implementation . . . in 
view of the fact that we ordinarily think that the rule of law is a moral good, it is 
worthwhile to strive to find a version of the concept that does not have these 
objectionable properties.32 
However, Gowder’s concerns seem to rely on an overly simplistic view of how 
we should conceptualize any requirement of obedience on the part of citizens. 
There is room in any analysis of an obligation to obey the law for that obligation 
to be conditional in nature. One may have an obligation to obey the law, 
conditional in part on what government officials do. To the extent that 
government officials fail in their obligations to adhere to the requirements of the 
rule of law, they undermine the conditions on which any obligation of obedience 
on the part of citizens depends. As Fuller, who defends the claim that there is an 
obligation to obey the law, notes,  
[T]here is a kind of reciprocity between government and the citizen with respect 
to the observance of rules. Government says to the citizen in effect, “These are 
the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance 
that they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct.” When this bond of 
 
 29. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 55. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 55, 146. 
 32. Id. at 52. 
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reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by government, nothing is left on 
which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe the rules.33 
One of the places Gowder defends the claim that obedience to law on the 
part of citizens is not what the rule of law requires is in his discussion of lynching 
in the United States.34 He references the case of Willie James Howard, whose 
killers were never prosecuted and whose grave went unmarked.35 His case, like 
others, Gowder claims, tells us about the “instrumental complicity of state 
authorities in private racial terror,” allowing whites to take individuals from jail, 
impeding chances of prosecution for those implicated in lynching, and 
participating in lynching in certain cases.36 Officials were instrumentally 
complicit in the sense that “at those rare moments where local officials actually 
tried to put a stop to the lynchings, they largely succeeded.”37 He concludes, 
“The rule of law is a condition to be established by and through the state, and by 
limiting the rule of law to a critique of the state’s behavior, we enable ourselves 
to see what the state did distinctively wrong in handling the lynchings: it 
withdrew its protections unequally from black citizens.”38 
In my view, the picture Gowder describes of lynchings overstates the 
independence of the power of the state from citizens, and, relatedly, it ignores 
the importance of the willingness of citizens to obey the law for the rule of law 
itself. To see its misleading character, let me consider another case, that of Sam 
Hose, a twenty-one-year-old Georgian who was lynched in 1899.39 Sam Hose 
was lynched for killing his white employer, Alfred Crawford, and allegedly 
raping his wife, Mattie, in their home after an altercation.40 Following the 
murder and alleged rape, Hose fled the town of Palmetto.41 Local newspapers 
ran stories about the murder and rape, writing also that when Hose was caught 
he would be killed or burned at the stake and that law enforcement should not 
interfere with “the people’s will” by protecting Hose from the lynch mob.42 
Given the gravity of the case, articles stated, the people could not be expected to 
wait until law enforcement and the courts weighed in.43 Along with this 
narrative, Hose was described in newspapers and details of a substantial 
financial award were published; the award was compiled by contributions from 
 
 33. FULLER, supra note 18, at 39–40 (footnote omitted). 
 34. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 55. 
 35. Id. at 54. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 55. 
 39. PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK 
AMERICA 3–4 (2002). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 4, 9. 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Id. 
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newspapers and wealthy businessmen as well as the governor for Hose’s 
capture.44 As in the case Gowder considers, police failed in their investigation, 
not going to the crime scene to gather evidence and only talking to the close 
friends and family of Crawford.45 
What matters for my purposes is the manner in which Hose was eventually 
captured and what transpired between his capture and brutal death. Hose had 
fled to his mother’s home, seventy-five miles away from the town of the 
murder.46 Eventually, the owners of the farm on which his mother stayed, 
brothers J.B. and J.L. Jones, learned of Hose’s presence and, aware of the 
reward, arranged with another farm worker to lure Hose to a party where he was 
apprehended.47 The farm owner tried to disguise Hose prior to going on a train 
so that he could be delivered over to law enforcement officials as the terms of 
the reward required.48 En route, a passenger recognized Hose.49 At a particular 
stop, sheriffs from two counties were waiting.50 They, the Joneses and railroad 
company representatives, decided that a special train would be used for the 
remainder of Hose’s journey.51 One hundred and fifty unofficial, armed escorts 
went on that special train.52 When the train arrived at Newman, dozens more 
men were waiting.53 Sheriff Joseph Brown of Newman and the Joneses were 
worried about the mob and agreed that they would escort him to the jail, at which 
point the Joneses would collect the award, and then Hose would be subsequently 
turned over to the lynch mob.54 However, as he was being marched to the prison, 
the mob turned on the sheriff, pointing a pistol at the sheriff and demanding that 
Hose be turned over to them at that point.55 The march to the final destination 
where the lynching eventually would take place took time, during which period 
trains arrived carrying spectators who had come after Sunday mass to witness 
the lynching.56 All told, 4000 spectators were present to participate in or witness 
Hose’s unspeakably brutal death.57 
As this case makes clear, it was not simply a matter of lack of will on the 
part of government officials to enforce legal protections to which black men like 
Hose were entitled. Citizens can render futile the actions of government officials 
 
 44. DRAY, supra note 39, at 8. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 9. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. DRAY, supra note 39, at 10. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. DRAY, supra note 39, at 10. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 12–13. 
 57. Id. at 14. 
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in defense of the rule of law, and the case of Hose makes clear the ways in which 
this was so. 
To blame citizens for murder alone in cases like Hose or, taking another 
case, suggest they were blameless for the failure to make substantive progress 
on legal enforcement of school desegregation is to offer an incomplete 
characterization of these cases. Among the 4000 witnesses to Sam Hose’s death 
were individuals directly responsible for his killing, and many more bystanders 
to his death.58 But this characterization misses the political character and 
purpose of his death. Hose’s death, and the role of citizens in it, was wrong not 
just because a human life was extinguished in a brutal manner, though it was 
wrong for this reason. It was wrong also because it was the demonstration on the 
part of thousands of citizens of a lack of willingness to restrain themselves in 
the way that law demands when faced with an alleged rape of a white woman 
and killing of a white man by a black suspect. It was wrong because of the 
manner in which the actions of the sheriff were rendered futile. These actions 
also undermined the ability of law to meaningfully govern conduct in fact. This 
was not an ordinary criminal murder; it was political in its purpose and impacted 
the possibility of respect for law by officials. 
Law is a social practice. Law depends on cooperative action and interaction 
between citizens and officials, as well as among officials. Citizens may certainly 
guard against the implementation of unjust rules, as Gowder rightly notes,59 but 
through their actions they can also impede the enforcement of rules worthy of 
protection. Citizens may render futile the rule of law-oriented activities of law 
enforcement officers through their refusal to comply with the restrictions and 
limitations law places upon the conduct of citizens. Such actions are rightly 
deserving of critique from the perspective of the rule of law; however, Gowder’s 
account does not enable us to criticize such actions as inimical to the rule of law. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that we have reason to question two assumptions underpinning 
Gowder’s analysis of the rule of law. My critical comments should not, however, 
overshadow the remarkable achievement this book represents. Gowder’s 
seamless weaving together of conceptual, historical, and empirical examinations 
of the rule of law significantly enriches our understanding of how law operates 
not just in theory, but also in practice. It sets a new standard for future 
interdisciplinary engagements of the rule of law, and definitively shows the 
necessity of having such engagements. 
  
 
 58. Id. at 13–14. 
 59. GOWDER, supra note 1, at 80. 
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